Saturday, June 10, 2017

Evolution and Reason

It is often claimed by theists that if our reason is a result of evolution, we have no reason to trust its veracity. However, this is not at all obvious. A reasoning capacity has clear adaptive usefulness, such as solving problems like finding food, determining dangers, even winning mates.

It may be argued that this does not account for its usefulness in more abstract areas like philosophy. We must remember however that most people do not turn it to such lofty areas. In any case, side effects of things can outstrip their original functions.

It seems that reason is actually more understandable on atheism. For if, as theists claim, reason is a gift of God, why make it this faulty? I do not think anyone would deny how we can be mislead. This argument against reason having a natural origin turns on the theist. For if they are right, then this is exactly what we would expect to see-an imperfect reason.

One obvious use for reason, on theism, is knowing God. This is the purpose of natural theology. While some theists deny that God can be known by reason alone, many concede it has usefulness, or natural theology would not still be a field of study. Even if they do not, it must be a tool given by God. Why, in either case, give a faulty one?

The question becomes particularly pressing with the first probable use on theism, knowing God. From the vast diversity of belief regarding God, even just within Christianity, it becomes clear that our reason is not a sure guide. On the second use, the faultiness is less problematic, but even so why give us a defective gift?

Possible responses have been that reason does tell us God exists, but we deny because we want to sin. Another is that the manifold differences in regards to religious belief are less than I have made out. On the first, it does not seem to be well supported. What evidence has there been given for this? Many people by all appearances sincerely believe in God and wish to serve him, yet their conclusions about this still can differ greatly. The second is far weaker I believe. We need simply note that polytheism is far more common historically than monetheism.

In conclusion, I believe that far from being evidence for theism, our reason and its flawed nature are far better explained on atheism.

Friday, June 9, 2017

Matter and Meaning

I came across an article on the Huffington Post expressing a view I've often seen, and want to address. Briefly, in it the author, Rabbi Adam Jacobs, claims "nonbelievers" must really at heart believe in something more than matter as their belief system isn't consistent.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabbi-adam-jacobs/the-god-test-why-really-e_b_1072965.html

Of course, saying all nonbelievers (I don't know whether he includes others besides atheists under that term) are materialists isn't true, but I'll simply ignore that, since it isn't the point of this post. Rather, even if we accepted materialism, what he claims isn't necessarily the case.

Jacobs claims that "nonbelievers" (here meaning materialists) must believe that nothing they ever do will matter, since none has any more significance than another. He says he's awaiting the person who admits this is the case. Well, there are some materialists who think this, but not all. Has he shown they must? I don't see it. How is "everything is matter" equal to "nothing means anything"?

Naturally, he suggests materialists that deny it are deluded. What follows is a brief series of basically "gotcha" questions for materialists. These include asking why materialists won't use the corpse of a loved one for dog food and suchlike. He claims any who said they wouldn't based on respect is simply in denial, with their notion being nothing more than a "subjective, non-intellectual whim" because they are simply "electrical blips in the skull". This again is not argued for, only assumed.

I'm not going to address every question, since they are much the same, but one he raises about art is good for illustrating the problem. He asks what significance on materialism a painting has, as it isn't good for food, etc. This assumes, of course, that only the most basic human urges would make sense on materialism, yet that is not shown. In any case, whether or not we accept materialism is true, aren't all paintings the arrangements of matter? Paint, wood, etc.? We might well ask where this significance comes in for it regardless. Some don't find much significance in many of the paintings out there. It is generally held to be a subjective quality.

There is also the assumption he makes that materialism is arbitrary, blind, random, etc. Again, this is not (at least entirely) the case for all materialists. There is also no reason things (like paintings) can't be composed of various matter which isn't meaningful itself, but has it over and above that, due to the specifics. After all, we can still tell the difference between a painting and jars of paint. Is that not a meaningful difference?

His article closes by saying anyone that rejects this view "may be more of a believer than you think". Assuming, of course, that only a "believer" can find meaning. What believers he does not say, but his religion would presumably be included, plus probably Christianity. So, is any religion sufficient? Even if they disagree about what the meaning is? He does not say.

This method of argument not only commits the strawman fallacy, but also an ad hominem, accusing anybody who rejects his conclusion of being in denial. Yet, as I hope I've shown, he hasn't made clear that his is the only logical conclusion on the philosophy being attacked. To make an analogy, if some gentile claimed he was in denial because his holy book commanded certain laws and Jacobs didn't act on them, I don't think he would agree that is right or fair.

In sum, be courteous to opponents. No one will be convinced by things like this. Unfortunately, it is about what I've come to expect at Huffington Post, from believers and nonbelievers alike. No doubt this is because controversy draws views. Sadly, any real depth is often lost or nonexistent.

Monday, October 17, 2016

Toward A Strong Atheism

For modern atheists in America, most take "atheism" to mean simply lack of belief in gods. This may be distinguished as "weak" atheism here, with the "strong" atheism being belief that no gods exist. However, in philosophy, atheism is defined solely as the "strong" variety. "Weak" atheism would be classed as a type of skepticism. Regardless, in this post I will refer to the view as strong atheism so it can be distinguished from the more common view of American atheists.

The reason for atheism to be defined as lack of belief in gods, and not belief gods do not exist, is said to be either (from atheists) because disbelief is the default position, or null hypothesis or (by theists) to escape any burden of proof. No matter who is right (and both can be correct in different cases) it seems to me a "strong" atheism is viable. Many philosophers have of course defended this since, as I said, atheism is defined that way in philosophy. More specifically, the belief God (as defined by classical theism-a being that is all powerful, all good, all wise and so on) does not exist.

It may surprise many atheists that there are many arguments against the existence of God. They are generally only familiar with arguments for God's existence. Yet while the strategy of only making counterarguments and thus declaring the case for God unproven can suffice, sound arguments that show God does not exist have an even stronger effect. For if the attributes given to God are more than just unproven, but also logically incompatible, then God cannot exist.

I do not think that atheists (for whatever reason) should shy away from holding the position that not only is God not proven, but he does not exist. The philosophical case for this can be and has been made. Philosophical or "strong" atheism is a better position to take, given its firmer and more solid approach. There is no need to settle for God simply being unproven. 

Tuesday, October 11, 2016

Absence of Evidence Is Evidence of Absence

Carl Sagan claimed that "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence". From what I gather, it was in reply to people who claimed that lacking evidence for alien life meant this didn't exist. Much as I respect Sagan, however, his claim is wrong. Lack of evidence is evidence that something is not there, it is just not proof. This may seem to be a semantic issue regarding what evidence and proof mean. Nonetheless, it seems to me that being clear in our terminology is very important. Much as in the similar slogan "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" which I examined in my last post (one Sagan also used) a confusion in our terms renders these hopelessly subjective and thus useless.

Evidence means something that tends to prove or disprove, or that grounds a belief. Proof on the other hand is evidence sufficient to establish that something is true, or produce such a belief. Thus, lack of evidence for aliens doesn't prove they don't exist. It does however tend in the direction. Of course a believer in aliens may certainly have some evidence for them as well. We must weigh any evidence for or against this. Often we do not have proof, or at least none which is strong. Therefore, though absence of evidence is not proof of absence, it is evidence of absence. A difference between these is real, and as is said, makes all the difference. They should not be confused in this way. 

Sunday, September 11, 2016

On Extraordinary Claims and Extraordinary Evidence

The phrase "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" is a common one among atheists and skeptics. While catchy, it's unclear what "extraordinary" actually means in this context. Most often it will be applied to claimed miracles and the like. Opponents will alleged this is merely a cover for the bias the person using it holds against such things. Frequently counterclaims will be made such as that accepting this standard would require throwing out many other things which can be labeled extraordinary, such as various historical events/persons or scientific findings.

What seems clear is no one can actually agree on what "extraordinary" means in a given case. For an atheist, claiming Jesus rose from the dead may be extraordinary, since it would require a god able to do things that seem impossible. For a Christian who believes such a god exists, it would not of course. The same can go for many other issues. Many people find the idea that evolution by itself could result in our existence to be extraordinary. People who accept the theory of evolution do not. Etc. 

So is there some way to salvage this? Perhaps. If we take "extraordinary" to mean simply "out of the ordinary" that might work as a definition. However, again what would be "out of the ordinary" seems hopelessly subjective. For many, believers and nonbelievers alike, miracles are out of the ordinary. Yet some believe they happen very frequently. Besides, what would be "out of the ordinary" evidence? Presumably simply hearing someone say how they witnessed a miraculous event would not suffice. That would be pretty ordinary evidence. Yet if we lack "out of the ordinary" evidence (video recordings, perhaps?) most such claims will be unsupported. Naturally believers suspect this is the point of the concept to begin with. 

Another tack may work. Rather than to quibble over the specifics, it might help if the skeptic pressed the believer about whether they would accept similar claims on the same evidence, and point out cases when they have not. For instance, the story of the Resurrection is told in the four Gospels. Yet they are second-hand (i.e. hearsay) and contradictory regarding who actually witnessed it. Contrasting this, the Book of Mormon claims eleven eyewitnesses who swore they saw the Golden Plates from which it was transcribed (one later somewhat recanted, but the rest did not). This would seem far better evidence by far, yet most Christians do not accept Mormonism. Perhaps then we can get into people's reasons to believe or disbelieve. A catchy slogan does not suffice. 

Thursday, September 8, 2016

The Supposed "Pro-Life" Inconsistency

Allow me to clarify briefly before delving into this. Certainly people can oppose capital punishment, war, etc. in addition to abortion. Specifically however consistent life ethics claims they should oppose these things if they oppose abortion to be consistent. I believe this is false. When the issue of abortion came into prominence with the late 1960s, early 1970s in the US, people who supported the right to have an abortion were then named "pro-choice", those against it "pro-life". These labels remain, despite how much the specific arguments have expanded and shifted over time.

In full disclosure, I am pro-choice myself. However, it does not seem at all apparent how having one view necessitates any others in this case. A person can be against abortion, but in favor of capital punishment, without being in contradiction. If they feel abortion is murder (as most do), and capital punishment the just penalty for that, that makes up a wholly consistent position. Obviously people can critique either of those views, as with any other. It does not follow, however, that because someone opposes killing in one instance they must do so universally. Situations differ.

For comparison, one could accuse pro-choice advocates of "inconsistency" for not advocating choice with every issue. The pro-choice person who is not also for school choice (which since most pro-choice people are progressives, would likely be the case) has not been inconsistent. They have two different opinions regarding the issues. I fail to see the inconsistency, and the only exception is if one says all killing is wrong, or every choice valid. Yet very few do this. Unless they do, it is not inconsistent. This does not make the pro-life position right (or wrong), but this particular argument is not valid. 

Sunday, September 4, 2016

Against the Association Fallacy

Much as I noted that the appeal to consequences fallacy comes up often in atheist/theist discourse (see my related post in 2013, "Against the Appeal to Consequences"), the association fallacy has as well. The very claim "atheism killed millions in the 20th century" (generally citing the Soviet Union and Maoist China) or "religion caused the crusades" (insert whatever examples in here that apply) is the association fallacy.

The Marxists responsible for these communist atrocities were indeed atheists, and the Crusades were obviously religious wars (although other factors also had a part). Yet all atheists, or people who have a religion, are hardly responsible for them. It could be argued these were a necessary result of these ideas, so even if individuals are not responsible, these ideas are.

However this too does not seem plausible. Is an atheist who's an Objectivist (a philosophy completely opposed to Marxism) responsible for the atrocities of Marxists? A religious pacifist for those of Crusaders or jihadists? To ever claim this requires painting everyone with the same brush. One must show why atheism or religion causes such misdeeds, regardless of details. To my knowledge this cannot be done. 

Claims of this kind are not only gross overgeneralizations, but a grave injustice for any person who does not share dogmatic, violence-affirming ideologies. On a practical level, these aspersions can do no more than alienate people, as they rightly find it deeply offensive, and discredit the people who make them through doing so in their minds, no matter what valid points may be offered on other topics. It's enough already, I'd say.